PRO SE LAKEWOOD MOM TAKES ON HOUSING AUTHORITY — AND WINS NEW HEARING

You don't necessarily need a lawyer to take City Hall to court.

Lakewood resident Juliana DePazza proved that point this week when she walked into Ocean County Superior Court without an attorney, challenged the Lakewood Housing Authority's decision to terminate her federally funded housing voucher — and walked out with an order sending the matter back for an entirely new hearing.

Superior Court Assignment Judge Francis R. Hodgson Jr. ordered the Lakewood Housing Authority to conduct a new hearing within 45 days and, significantly, ordered the agency to first provide DePazza with new notice "that addresses all allegations to be raised at the hearing."

That seemingly simple requirement — tell someone what they are accused of before adjudicating the accusation — was at the heart of DePazza's challenge.

And it is an important reminder that decisions made by municipal agencies aren't necessarily the last word.

The controversy began with a Housing Choice Voucher issued to DePazza under the Family Unification Program, commonly known as FUP.

Even the Housing Authority's own court papers acknowledged that it issued DePazza the voucher on October 8, 2025. The agency later received allegations concerning conditions at her previous residence and her subsequent stay at the Pelican Inn & Suites. The Housing Authority ultimately terminated the voucher.

DePazza requested an administrative hearing, which took place on January 15, 2026. Six days later, LHA issued its final determination leaving the termination in effect. The agency's letter expressly advised DePazza that it was a final administrative decision and that any further challenge would require a civil action.

So DePazza did exactly that.

She sued.

And she did it pro se — without an attorney.

HOW DO YOU "APPEAL" A HOUSING AUTHORITY DECISION?

This is where the case becomes particularly interesting.

A person aggrieved by the final decision of a local governmental agency such as a municipal housing authority does not necessarily file an ordinary lawsuit for damages, nor does she simply ask another government official to reconsider the matter.

New Jersey provides a mechanism known as an action in lieu of prerogative writs.

In plain English, it allows the Superior Court to review whether a local governmental body exercised its governmental power lawfully.

The Housing Authority itself laid out the governing standard in its trial brief: a court reviewing the final decision of a local administrative agency ordinarily gives the agency substantial deference. The judge does not simply substitute his own judgment because he might have reached a different result.

But that deference has limits.

An agency decision can be overturned where it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. And even an agency entitled to deference must act consistently with the statutes and regulations governing it.

That means a housing authority gets considerable latitude to administer its programs.

It does not get carte blanche.

One of DePazza's central arguments was strikingly straightforward.

She contended that LHA's November 25 termination notice identified allegations concerning property damage and poor housekeeping at her former Vaughn Avenue residence and allegations that she caused "chaos and panic" at the Pelican Inn.

But when she appeared for her January 15 hearing, according to her court papers, allegations concerning another location — Hawthorne Suites — were introduced for the first time.

Those allegations, DePazza argued in court, weren't contained in the termination notice she received.

DePazza pointed the court to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555, the federal regulation governing informal hearings in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program.

Her argument was essentially basic due process: an agency cannot give someone notice of Grounds A and B, have that person show up prepared to defend Grounds A and B, and then inject Ground C into the adjudication without previously telling her that Ground C was part of the case.

DePazza argued that introducing the Hawthorne allegations violated HUD's hearing requirements and deprived her of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense.

The Housing Authority came to court represented by counsel and urged Hodgson to leave its decision alone. Its position was that there was substantial evidence supporting termination.

LHA pointed to photographs and information supplied by DePazza's former landlord concerning alleged property damage and poor housekeeping. The Authority argued that it wasn't required to conduct a "full evidentiary trial" to determine precisely who caused each damaged item before considering the landlord's information. It also relied upon allegations concerning DePazza's conduct at the Pelican Inn, including allegations that she created "panic and chaos," made inappropriate statements to minors, recorded families and children and posted videos to social media, and failed to keep her room clean.

The Authority therefore argued that its decision fell comfortably within the discretion courts normally afford administrative agencies.

DePazza wasn't buying it.

In a reply filed just before trial, DePazza turned LHA's own argument against it. If the Housing Authority admitted it didn't determine who actually caused the property damage, she argued, that was hardly a reason to affirm the decision.

DePazza asserted that the damage was intertwined with documented domestic violence and that LHA had received a signed HUD domestic-violence certification before terminating her voucher. She invoked the Violence Against Women Act, arguing that federal law prohibited the housing provider from attributing to her damage or conduct directly related to domestic violence committed against her.

She raised other arguments as well, including alleged retaliation, alleged deficiencies in the hearing record and a Fair Housing Act reasonable-accommodation claim.

But the notice problem was particularly difficult to get around.

Following trial held on Monday, Hodgson has just issued an order. The result was not an outright judicial reinstatement of DePazza's voucher, and the court did not award her damages.

Instead, the judge did something highly consequential to the administrative proceeding: He wiped out the finality of the existing hearing process and sent the case back to LHA to do it again.

The Housing Authority must conduct a new hearing within 45 days.

DePazza must receive new notice.

And this time, the judge expressly ordered that the notice must address all allegations that LHA intends to raise at the hearing.

In other words, if the Housing Authority wants to take away a housing benefit based upon an allegation, the recipient gets to know that allegation before she is expected to defend herself against it.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GET DEFERENCE — NOT A BLANK CHECK

The case illustrates an important but sometimes misunderstood feature of New Jersey law.

Local boards and agencies make countless decisions affecting residents — zoning approvals, licenses, employment determinations and, as here, housing benefits. Courts generally do not micromanage those agencies or rehear every factual dispute from scratch.

But judicial deference is not judicial surrender.

Through an action in lieu of prerogative writs, a resident can ask a Superior Court judge to examine whether a local governmental body acted within the law, followed required procedures, based its determination upon substantial evidence and avoided arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable decision-making.

Indeed, LHA's own brief acknowledged both halves of that equation: housing authorities receive substantial deference, provided their decisions remain consistent with governing statutes and regulations and are supported by the record.

That proviso turned out to matter.

DePazza originally came to court alleging that LHA had terminated a voucher intended to help stabilize her family while relying upon disputed allegations and an administrative proceeding she claimed did not afford her the process federal law required. Her pretrial submission specifically challenged the termination as procedurally defective and factually unsupported.

The Housing Authority arrived represented by counsel and defended its determination.

DePazza arrived representing herself.

When it was over, the Housing Authority's existing determination wasn't permitted to stand as the end of the matter.

The agency was ordered back to the drawing board — with a new hearing, a 45-day deadline and a judicial directive that, this time around, DePazza must be told all of the allegations against her before the hearing begins.

For a pro se litigant taking on a government agency, that's no small victory.

FAA News will continue following the case as the Lakewood Housing Authority conducts the court-ordered rehearing.

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